We hypothesize that the degree of public attention influences the price level of stocks in a systematic way. We employ a simple discounted cash flow model with adverse selection and fixed transaction costs that determine an endogenous bid-ask-spread. In the model, rational and risk neutral investors incorporate future trading conditions into their price setting behavior. These trading conditions are driven by the degree of public attention and entail an attention-dependent impact of the bid-ask-spread on required gross returns. Specifically, given a high level of public attention a higher bid-ask-spread may negatively affect required asset returns. We argue that the model implications are consistent with empirical findings, i.e. size, bookto-market, and the momentum effect.
A. Introduction
There has been a long-standing discussion about the drivers of cross-sectional returns of stocks. Traditional asset pricing models build on risk factors combined with risk aversion. The exposure of a stock to each risk factor together with the respective risk premium determines its expected return.
1 We, instead, focus on variations in adverse selection, fixed transaction costs and public attention in a risk neutral world in order to explain return differences. By public attention we mean how many investors (non-owners) stand ready to trade a specific stock relative to the number of current owners. In our approach high (low) public attention implies good (bad) trading conditions for stock owners. In a very simple setting, we show that these market microstructure issues are sufficient to generate cross-sectional stock returns in a systematic fashion. We model an order-driven market where identical risk-neutral investors submit bid and ask orders for a single asset which enables us to endogenize asset liquidity as a result of asymmetric information and fixed trading costs. Thus, we derive the determinants of the bid-ask-spread that are in line with well established findings of standard market microstructure literature. In addition to that, our approach gives rise to empirical implications how the determinants of the bid-ask-spread influence asset prices and returns. Thereby, we distinguish between two different regimes conditional upon the degree of public attention. From the standard market microstructure literature 2 , we know that informational asymmetries cause adverse selection costs, leading to a bid-ask-spread or illiquidity respectively (e.g. Glosten & Milgrom (1985) , Kyle (1985) or John & Narayanan (1997) ). The bid-ask spread is also influenced by order handling costs and inventory costs (e.g. Garman (1976) , Stoll (1978) , or Grossman & Miller (1988) ). However, there are only few models that relate these sources of illiquidity to asset prices for cross-sectional purposes. Amihud & Mendelson (1986) employ a discounted cash flow model with risk neutral investors and show that exogenous transaction costs may reduce asset prices significantly in equilibrium. They show that equilibrium returns are a piece-1 See Fama & French (1993) . 2 For an overview see O'Hara (1998) or Hasbrouck (2007) .
wise linear concave function of an exogenous bid-ask spread, depending on the level of exogenous transaction cost and the turnover rate of the investors who hold an asset. Constantinides (1986) instead argues that proportional transaction costs can only have a rather small effect on expected returns, because investors accommodate such costs by reducing the frequency and volume of trade. Similarly, Vayanos (1998) shows in a general equilibrium model with endogenous trading frequencies that exogenous trading costs should have a rather small effect on equilibrium returns. Gârleanu & Pedersen (2004) endogenize bid-ask spreads as a result of asymmetric information about an asset's payoff. They assume risk neutral agents, who are symmetric ex ante, and who trade repeatedly, so that their expected future gains due to private information, offset their future losses caused by adverse selection. Therefore, they do not find that the bid-ask-spread, arising from asymmetric information, directly affects required returns. However, they find that there are allocation inefficiencies which should have effects on returns. Wang (1993) shows in an inter-temporal asset pricing model with endogenous transaction costs due to adverse selection risk that uninformed investors demand higher expected returns. However, in his model there are informed traders who make the price more informative, which in turn decreases uncertainty. Because these two effects offset each other, the net effect of private information on returns is ambiguous. More recently, Easley & O'Hara (2004) show in a rational expectations model with risk averse investors that, comparing two otherwise identical stocks, the stock with more private information and less public information should have a larger expected excess return. Acharya & Pedersen (2005) analyze the impact of stochastic changes in liquidity and find that liquidity per se as well as the liquidity risk is priced in equilibrium. In a straightforward extension of the standard capital asset pricing model, they introduce three additional betas that account for the different liquidity risk factors.
Empirical results about the pricing impact of illiquidity on returns are not conclusive. Among others, Amihud & Mendelson (1986) , Amihud & Mendelson (1989) and Eleswarapu (1997) present evidence that bid-ask spreads as a measure of liquidity are reflected in required returns. Chalmers & Kadlec (1998) find that amortized spreads (i.e. bid-ask-spread times turnover) rather than unamortized spreads are priced. For other measures of liquidity Brennan & Subrahmanyam (1996) , Datar et al. (1998) , Amihud (2002) , Easley et al. (2002) , and Pástor & Stambaugh (2003) also find empirical evidence that transaction costs and illiquidity costs are priced. However, Eleswarapu & Reinganum (1993) provide evidence that trading costs, measured by bid-ask spreads, are only priced in January. We contribute to this literature about liquidity and required returns by generating plausible and testable hypotheses based on a simple and intuitive discounted cash flow model that integrates illiquidity. We show how illiquidity enters the price level in form of amortized future adverse selection costs and future fixed transaction costs.
3 This allows us to derive the impact of public attention on required returns. The idea that public attention may influence cross-sectional returns is not entirely new. Although differently motivated, Merton (1987) showed that investor recognition as a kind of public attention should drive return differences. Our starting point is a variant of the Amihud & Mendelson (1986) -model where we neglect the clientele effect. Our extension is to endogenize the bid-ask-spread as a result of fixed costs and adverse selection costs. Amihud & Mendelson (1986) assume a competitive market maker who runs the market. In contrast to that, we presume an order-driven market that allows every investor to place limit and market orders, conditional upon his ownership status and his informational endowment. This approach is closely related to Gârleanu & Pedersen (2004) . Similarly to them, our model also features an endogenous bid-ask spread which compensates liquidity suppliers for their expected current costs, when posting a limit order. What is different is that we consider an unlimited time horizon and that our model is not restricted to a single trader with private information. More importantly, Gârleanu & Pedersen (2004) assume that the security is traded repeatedly by investors who are symmetric ex ante, so that expected gains due to informational advantages equal expected losses due to liquidity shocks. Therefore, they come to the conclusion that future trading costs (i.e. future bid-ask-spreads) should not impact current prices. In contrast to that, we presume agents who only consider a round-trip investment in the security. Thus, we do find that the bid-ask-spread induces a price-level effect. This level effect leads to cross-sectional variations in required gross returns, which can be attributed to differences in fixed trading costs, risk measures driving adverse selection, investor's exogenous liquidity demand as well as public attention. We also consider an extension of the model by analyzing the impact of different levels of public information.
This sheds a new light on the perception of the bid-ask-spread. A large literature considers the bid-ask-spread as costs that occur when investors trade an asset. This view is a consequence of the often made assumption that investors buy and sell at prices that are determined solely by market makers. In this paper however, we operate without a market maker by assuming that every investor can submit either limit or market orders. The probability that agents conduct trades via one of the two possible order types is exogenously determined and depends crucially on public attention. The decisive point is that, whenever owners are forced to sell due to exogenous reasons, they only realize the bid price, and the cost of trading is the total bid-ask-spread. On the other hand, when investors sell at their reservation price, which is the ask price, the bid-ask-spread is not a cost. From this it follows that, whenever investors believe that it is highly probable to sell at the ask price, they do not consider the bid-ask-spread as exogenous costs as in Amihud & Mendelson (1986) . Thus, the probability to sell at the ask price, which is driven by public attention, is crucial in our approach.
These above-given arguments also relate to the literature about order imbalance. Order imbalance is an empirical measure, derived from intraday stock price data, which gives the differential of the number of orders executed at ask prices and bid prices. Positive (negative) order imbalance means that more trades happen at ask (bid) prices. Obviously, this ratio is related to the probability of selling at bid or ask prices, and can therefore be considered as a possible measure for public attention in terms of our model.
Empirical studies, such as Chordia et al. (2002) , find that market-wide returns are positively affected by contemporaneous signed order imbalance. However, lagged order imbalance is found to have a negative effect on stock returns. For individual stocks, Chordia & Subrahmanyam (2004) find the same relation between order imbalance and returns. Bailey et al. (2009) and Kaul & Kayacetin (2008) confirm this pattern and the latter validate that order imbalance is persistent over several months. Chordia & Subrahmanyam (2004) provide an explanation for the observed relation between order imbalance and returns. They assume investors who minimize their price impact by splitting orders across periods, thus causing autocorrelated order imbalance. Risk averse market makers handle the thereby emerging inventory risk by adjusting prices according to current and lagged imbalance. Their accommodation of autocorrelated order imbalance is what may explain the empirically observed pattern. As an alternative, our model suggests that a high probability to sell at ask prices (i.e. high positive order imbalance) simply implies that investors expect lower future trading costs, when selling the asset (since the ask price gives them compensation for adverse selection and fixed costs). Consequently, agents are willing to pay higher prices, which results in lower future returns. Thus, our model may provide an alternative approach to explain the empirical relation between order imbalance and returns.
Our model is also related to the literature concerning the momentum effect, first discovered by Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) . Past positive (negative) returns may induce higher (lower) public attention (see for example Lehavy & Sloan (2008) ). Within our model, when public attention rises (falls) over time, the probability to sell at the ask price increases (decreases), leading to successively higher (lower) price levels, inducing momentum. From this point of view, return continuation is (mostly) driven by systematic changes in the trading costs and is a rational response of liquidity providing investors to changing market conditions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first section presents the basic model and shows how the equilibrium prices and excess returns are influenced by the model parameters. Moreover, it is shown how public information impacts prices, pointing at the positive role of public information provided by, for example, analyst coverage. The second section discusses the implications of the model for observed return regularities. The last section summarizes the findings and draws final conclusions.
B. The model
Consider a stock that distributes dividends d t to its owners according to
where ǫ t is white noise with E[ ǫ t ] = 0, V ar( ǫ t ) > 0, and Cov( ǫ t , ǫ t−1 ) = 0. Specifically, we consider a discrete model setting by assuming that ǫ t is a random variable with two possible outcomes:
where the dividend increase is a priori as likely as a dividend decrease. Consequently, the dividend process is consistent with a binomial process with a probability equal to 1 2 . The capital market consists of overall N * a priori equal investors. A fraction λ of those investors is actively trading the considered asset. Consequently, at each time step we have λN * = N investors who are willing to trade the asset with M outstanding stocks. It is assumed that all investors are risk neutral and that they can only possess one share. This implies that investors have no quantity decision to make when selling or buying the asset. Consequently, there are M investors who already own one share and thus represent potential sellers, whereas all the other N − M investors, the non-owners, represent potential buyers.
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All investors, owners and non-owners, are equal in the sense that they have the same probability of being informed (β) about the next dividend move, and they are also equal concerning the probability of experiencing a liquidity shock (α).
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We assume that agents cannot be informed and experience a liquidity shock at the same time. Therefore, we exclude from our considerations the allocation costs which are elaborated by Gârleanu & Pedersen (2004) . Our assumptions about the investors are summarized in figure 1.
Owners (Non-Owners) with a liquidity shock use market orders to sell (buy)
immediately. Investors with valuable private information have an advantage, because they know in advance whether the dividend will increase or decrease. Since ownership is limited to one share and short selling is prohibited, informed investors employ two different strategies to profit from their informational advantage. De-4 Short selling is excluded by assumption. 5 A liquidity shock means that agents experience an exogenous need to buy or sell the asset immediately. This is an often made assumption in market microstructure literature. As possible justifications, among others, tax issues, financial distress, hedging and portfolio rebalancing are often named. The circle symbolizes the probability of each agent to belong to one of the three groups. With probability α an owner (non-owner) experiences a liquidity shock and has to sell (buy) the asset via a market order. Each investor also knows that there is the probability β of obtaining valuable information. An informed owner (non-owner) sells (buys) submitting a market order if she knows that the dividend will decrease (increase). Whenever an informed owner (non-owner) knows that the dividend will increases (decreases), she refrains from submitting any order since investors are restricted to hold one share and short-selling is excluded. With the remaining probability of 1 − α − β an agent is uninformed and has no liquidity shock and therefore submits a limit sell (buy) order if she is owning (not owning) the asset.
pending on their ownership status and their private information, they either refrain from submitting any order or trade immediately through a market order. We assume that informed owners (non-owners) use market orders to sell (buy) only when they know that the dividend will decrease (increase). 6 Since the probability of being informed equals β, and the probability of an either positive or negative dividend change is 1 2
, the probability of each investor to use a market order due to valuable information equals 1 2 β. If investors have neither valuable information nor any liquidity reasons to trade immediately, they submit limit orders. Since informed investors as well as investors who experience a liquidity shock never use limit orders, the probability that an investor does not submit a limit order equals α + β.
In every period the expected number of shares supplied or demanded by liquidity providing investors is (1 − α − β)M and (1 − α − β)(N − M), respectively. We 6 We are well aware that informed investors could also use limit orders to maximize profits. But the usage of limit orders strongly depends on their execution probability. Given the execution probability is low enough, expected profits resulting from a limit order strategy are lower than that of a market order strategy. Since our intention is to model a market with asymmetrically informed investors and not to model the order selection decisions, we assume that the market order strategy is always the dominant one. This also preserves simplicity in our model.
assume that the number of liquidity providing limit orders is always greater than the number of liquidity seeking market orders for both, the bid and ask side of the market. This allows us to avoid a rationing and enables the calculation of execution probabilities for limit orders. Market orders are therefore always executed and randomly matched with limit orders. Since liquidity providing investors are by definition uninformed, they face an adverse selection problem. This is due to the fact that investors with valuable private information only submit market orders in cases that are favorable to them.
Informed owners only sell via market orders if they know that the dividend will decrease. Similarly, non-owners only buy via market orders if they have information that the dividend will increase. Therefore, for example, from a liquidity supplying non-owner's point of view (i.e. investors who submit bid orders), this leads to the following two execution probabilities (q) that are conditional upon the upcoming dividend realization. 7 In the state that is favorable to a potential buyer (i.e. the dividend will increase), we have
.
And in the unfavorable state (i.e. the dividend will decrease), the execution probability of the limit buy order is
The fact that q(favorable) < q(unfavorable) is the force that drives the adverse selection costs in the model.
The same arguments can be used to determine the execution probabilities for liquidity supplying owners. Table 1 exhibits execution probabilities for liquidity suppliers on the owner and non-owner side for all possible states.
The iterative procedure of events in each time step is depicted in figure 2. First the dividends are distributed to the owners. Then, with probability β agents 7 The interpretation as execution probability is only valid for a particular market composition, i.e. the ratio of owners to non-owners has to meet certain criteria. It can be shown that it has to be assumed that (α + β) < M N < (1 − α − β) holds. This is equivalent to assuming that all market orders are executed immediately. Table 1 : Execution probabilities of the standing limit orders from the liquidity supplying investors' point of view, conditional upon each possible dividend development.
receive private information about the dividend in the next time step or, with probability α, a liquidity shock. Next, they submit their orders and the market is cleared at the limit prices. After trade taking place, the dividend change is made public. The new dividend is distributed in the next time step, where the whole procedure recurs. Next, we determine the revenue a stock owner can expect until she leaves the market. Stock owners receive a stream of dividends d t until some stopping time τ . Stopping may happen because of (i) an exogenous selling need (i.e. a liquidity shock), (ii) valuable information, or (iii) the execution of a limit sell order. The probability to sell via a market order (stopping cases i and ii) is α + 1 2 β. The expected execution probability of a limit sell order is the average of the execution probabilities in the two possible states, i.e. γ = (α+
, where φ is defined as the ratio of non-owners to owners, i.e. φ =
. The parameter φ is of major importance in the model, as it represents what we denote as public attention. High (low) φ implies a large (small) number of potential investors N in comparison to the number of owners M. Therefore, we interpret higher φ as higher public attention. Since the probability of submitting a limit order equals (1 − α − β), the probability of selling the asset through a limit order (stopping case iii) has to equal (1−α−β)γ.
This allows us to calculate the probability of stopping at any time (µ) as
As shown in the appendix, the expected liquidation price can be calculated as
denotes the ask (bid) price. Therefore, in the case of stopping, investors expect to receive P minus the fixed transaction cost (c). The expected present value of the revenue from holding the asset, given the discount rate r and today's dividend d, is
Observe that the present value of the revenue is a linear function of the future stock prices. Now we are ready to determine the equilibrium bid and ask prices. In equilibrium, those prices are set by the liquidity supplying investors, so that they expect to break even, i.e. earn at least an expected return equal to their opportunity cost r. When submitting a limit order, liquidity supplying investors are uninformed, so that they do not know which dividend state comes up. However, they are aware of the market structure, i.e. the probabilities of informed and uninformed trading.
In short, they anticipate adverse selection costs. This leads to equation 2 and 3, which give the two zero-profit conditions. Equation 2 (3) represents the zero-profit condition for liquidity supplying owners (non-owners) who determine the ask price (bid price). Zero expected profit implies that the revenue from submitting a limit order equals the associated costs.
An owner's revenue is the received ask price minus fixed costs which, in equilibrium, has to equal the missed revenue from further holding the asset (i.e. the associate costs). Analogously, the proceeds of a non-owner are represented by the expected holding revenue, which in equilibrium has to equal the paid price plus fixed transaction costs (i.e. the associated costs). Liquidity supplying investors use the execution probabilities given in table 1 to weight each possible outcome.
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They anticipate adverse selection and, consequently, condition the revenue/cost upon the two possible dividend states. Therefore ∆ and represents the permanent shift in the expected liquidation price P , when the dividend changes by ∆.
Since uninformed liquidity supplying investors are aware of the adverse selection risk, they adjust the bid and ask prices, so that the expected disadvantage from informed trading is compensated. Observe that both prices, P a and P b , show up in both zero-profit equation, which thus have to be solved simultaneously for P a and P b . After some algebraic transformations, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The bid (P b ) and ask price (P a ) and the spread (S) when solving 9 Note that the relevant probabilities from table 1 all have a common factor that can be dropped from the zero-profit conditions. Hence, the execution probabilities in equation 2 and 3 reduce to α and α + β respectively. equation 2 and 3 simultaneously are
where
The two expressions for the bid and ask price allow for a sensible interpretation. The formulas constitute of five terms. The first three terms, which are equal in both equations, can be interpreted as price level components. The last two terms are also equal, except for their signs. These two terms cause the difference between the bid and ask prices and can be interpreted as spread components.
One term of the spread components can be attributed to fixed transaction costs and the other to adverse selection costs. The influence of fixed transaction costs (c) is straightforward. Uninformed owners (non-owners) are only willing to sell (buy) if the price compensates them for immediately accruing fixed transaction costs.
Therefore c enters positively (negatively) the ask (bid) price. The second term of the spread component, i.e. A 3 ∆, represents the compensation that is required due to adverse selection costs. Since liquidity supplying investors only trade if they expect compensation for their informational disadvantage, the adverse selection component enters the ask (bid) price with a positive (negative) sign. Furthermore, proposition 1 suggests that the bid and ask prices lie symmetrically around some price level ( P ) so that P = P a − , represents the expected present value of infinite dividend payments. It is the fundamental value in a world without liquidity shocks, informed trading or asymmetric information. The next term, A 1 c, drags the price level down. This term can be interpreted as the present value of all future fixed transaction costs, taking the trading frequency into account. Our proposition suggests that the influence of future fixed transaction costs on the price level is always negative. The third term, A 2 ∆, can be attributed to the influence of adverse selection costs on the expected liquidation revenue P , again taking the expected trading frequency into account. Whether the sign of A 2 ∆ is positive or negative, depends on the public attention parameter (φ). This relation is discussed in more detail in the following section about the model's comparative statics.
Next, we analyze the required gross return of a liquidity supplying buyer who buys the asset at P b . We define the required gross return as r * = E d+P P b − 1. This definition assumes a round trip, where the stock is bought at the bid price P b and sold for the expected liquidation value P after one period.
− 1, the required gross return (r * ) can be stated as r
Obviously, the required return r * consists of the overall discount rate r plus three additional premiums. These three premiums can again be attributed to the two sources of illiquidity, which are fixed transaction costs and adverse selection costs. The first term, B 1 c, represents the premium that arises due to the effect of fixed transaction costs on the price level. B 2 ∆ is the premium that can be attributed to the effect of adverse selection costs on the price level. Since the spread (S) enters the final term, B 3 S, it should be considered as a premium that is attributed to current trading costs.
Equation 7 is the return that is required by liquidity supplying non-owners who are uninformed, so that their costs are compensated. The problem with r * is that, for practical purposes, the required return, as suggested in proposition 2, may be difficult to determine, as the expected liquidation value P is unknown. Therefore, as a more feasible alternative, we also use the mid-quote (denoted by P ) to calculate returns. Define the newly introduced expected gross return as
The so defined return is no longer directly influenced by the bid-ask-spread. This allows us to state proposition 3:
Proposition 3 If the return is based on the midquote P , it can be stated as
Proposition 3 suggests that the return i * still consists of the opportunity return r plus two premiums. These premiums result from the two sources of the bid-askspread, i.e. fixed transaction costs (B * 1 c) and adverse selection costs (B * 2 ∆). The advantage of the return as it is stated in proposition 3 is its analogy with the gross return used in common asset pricing tests. The comparative statics in the next section base upon spread S and return i * . The so obtained signs imply hypotheses that are testable with empirical observable spreads and returns.
B.1 Comparative static analysis
Now we turn to the comparative static analysis, where we investigate how the parameters affect the results in proposition 1 and 3. Our goal is to depict the cross-sectional differences among bid-ask-spreads and expected gross returns. We hope that this analysis entails many new empirically testable hypothesis.
The results of the comparative statics in respect of the bid-ask-spread are depicted in table 2. Ceteris paribus, the spread depends negatively on uninformed liquidity demand (α) and positively on informed liquidity demand (β). Since an Spread uninformed liquidity demand (α) − informed liquidity demand (β) + dividend volatility (∆) + fixed transaction costs (c) + increasing β and a decreasing α is associated with higher informational asymmetries, this implies that raising adverse selection costs widen the bid-ask-spread. In addition to that, the spread depends positively on the volatility of the dividend process (∆). This translates into a positive dependence of the spread in respect of the uncertainty concerning future dividends. What is also barely surprising is the positive influence of fixed transaction costs (c) on the spread. The public attention (φ) does not enter the bid-ask-spread and therefore has no impact on it. Please note that all comparative static results given in table 2 are as standard market microstructure theory would suggest.
In addition to the spread, we also elaborate on the comparative statics of gross returns as defined in proposition 3, i.e.
. This definition implies that the derived signs in respect of i * have to be strictly the opposite to the comparative statics of the price level ( P ). All in all, the dependence of the return on model parameters is not unambiguous for all of them. In this context, the attention parameter φ is of crucial importance, as it determines whether the ambiguous parameters positively or negatively influence returns. Therefore, we distinguish between two regimes, φ > 1 and φ < 1. A summary of these comparative statics is given in table 3.
First, consider the parameters with an equal effect on returns in both regimes.
These parameters are uninformed liquidity demand (α), fixed transaction costs (c) and the public attention parameter (φ). α unambiguously affects the price level ( P ), because it only enters the fixed transaction cost component (A 1 c) where its negative influence stems from. Higher α translates into a higher trading frequency, and therefore entails overall higher future transaction costs, which have to be compensated by lower price levels and thus higher gross returns. The unambiguous influence of c on returns is also straight forward. As fixed transaction costs in- crease, investors demand higher gross returns. Moreover, the attention parameter φ is negatively related to returns. Recall that φ represents the ratio of non-owners (N − M) to owners (M). As the ratio of non-owners to owners increases, investors who estimate an asset's liquidation value believe to sell rather at ask prices than at bid prices. Since investors who sell at ask prices (i.e. via a limit order) do not consider the bid-ask-spread as costs, the expected liquidation price (P ) increases and is dragged closer towards the ask price P a . This implies a ceteris paribus higher price level ( P ) and thus lower expected returns. The remaining two parameters, informed liquidity demand (β) and dividend volatility (∆), are of particular interest, because their influence on returns depends on the public attention parameter φ. The importance of φ arises from its influence on the expected future liquidation price (P ). On the one hand, if φ < 1, we have a regime with low public attention. In this regime, P is dragged more towards the lower bid price as investors assume to sell rather at bid prices (via market orders) than at ask prices (via limit orders). As a consequence, agents perceive the bid-ask-spread as costs in the spirit of Amihud & Mendelson (1986) . On the other hand, a stock with φ > 1 implies high public attention. In this regime P is closer to the ask price, because investors expect a high probability that the limit sell order is executed. Consequently, when public attention is high, investors do not consider the bid-ask-spread as costs for which compensationà la Amihud & Mendelson (1986) is required.
Consider now the case φ < 1. Under this regime, the comparative static influence of the two parameters β and ∆ on returns is as one would expect. The dividend volatility ∆ is positively related to returns. This translates into a ceteris paribus higher return if the dividend risk increases. Furthermore, β is also pos-itively related to returns. It seems intuitive that investors demand higher gross returns if β, the probability of informed trading, increases. Recall from table 2 that ∆ and β are both positively related to the spread. As mentioned above, in the regime where φ < 1, the spread is interpreted as costs. Therefore, as the spread increases with raising β and ∆, investors require higher gross returns as compensation.
In the second regime where φ > 1, we have high public attention. What we have in mind are, for example, fast growing firms, which are still relatively small but with innovative products and an extraordinary high investor recognition. In such a regime, ∆ is negatively related to returns. This suggests that a higher dividend uncertainty may lead to a lower (!) required gross return. The comparative statics for the informed liquidity demand (β) can be either positive or negative. This ambiguous effect of β on the price level arises due to its opposing impact on the fixed cost term (A 1 c) and the adverse selection term (A 2 ∆) of the price level ( P ). However, the bottom line is that a higher informed liquidity demand may, under certain circumstances, result in a lower (!) required gross return. The intuition of these findings is that high public attention implies that the bid-askspread is not considered as costs. In this regime, investors know that they rather sell at the ask price (via a limit order) than at the bid price (via a market order) and, consequently, receive compensation for adverse selection and fixed transaction costs. Therefore, as the bid-ask-spread increases when β and ∆ increase, investors do not require higher gross returns. In contrast, the elevated ask price in addition to the high probability to sell at this price leads to a higher expected liquidation value P . This, in turn, entails a higher price level and thus lower expected gross returns.
An illustrative numerical example of these findings is shown in the two plots of figure 3 . There, the mid price ( P ) is plotted as a function of β and ∆ for different values of φ. It is clearly shown that for φ > 1 the price level is positively related to β and ∆ and that this relation reverses if φ < 1. The whole comparative static analysis entails testable empirical implications. The regime where φ < 1 could be interpreted as a situation where rather normal/low public attention is observed for a specific stock. For this regime, the model predicts per se higher returns and also a positive relation between infor- mational asymmetries and required returns. However, the regime where φ > 1 could be interpreted as a situation with extraordinary high public attention. For such a regime, the model predicts per se lower returns and also a possibly negative relation between informational asymmetries and returns. Empirical findings of the literature related to order imbalance and investor recognition can be interpreted as evidence consistent with some predictions of the here presented comparative statics. Since order imbalance assesses the probability to sell at bid or ask prices, we argue that it is simply a proxy for public attention. In line with our predictions are findings (e.g. from Lehavy & Sloan (2008) , Chordia & Subrahmanyam (2004) or Kaul & Kayacetin (2008) ) that order imbalance or investor recognition is positively related to contemporaneous returns, and negatively to future returns. If investor recognition and order imbalance measure public attention, these findings are in line with the predictions of the model. However, the regime-dependent impact of specific parameters on returns is new and thus open to empirical verification.
B.2 Effects of additional public information
The model also allows to analyze the effect of additional public information on the bid-ask-spread and the price level. What we have in mind are observable differences in firms' information policy or in the analyst coverage of stocks. In an influential paper, Diamond & Verrecchia (1991) argue that a higher level of publicly available information reduces informational asymmetries and firms' cost of capital. Empirically, Hong et al. (2000) show that measures of a firm's analyst coverage help to explain the cross-section of expected returns. Specifically, they
show that low-coverage stocks react more sluggishly to bad news than to good news. Brennan et al. (1993) find faster adjustments to new information for stocks with wider analyst following. Brennan & Subrahmanyam (1995) find that firms with higher analyst coverage face smaller adverse selection costs than do firms with fewer analysts.
We assume that all investors receive an informative signal. This signal has two possible realizations, positive or negative with equal probability. The positive (negative) signal indicates that the next period's dividend is more likely to increase (decrease) and thus changes investor's perceived probability of the two possible dividend states. The introduction of public information implies a new sequence of events for each time step, which is depicted in figure 4. Investors use the signal to update the a priori probability of a dividend change. In the basic model setting, the a priori probability of a dividend change equals 1 2 . Now q n represents the updated probability of a dividend decrease, given a negative signal is received. Analogously, q p denotes the probability of a dividend decrease, given a positive signal is received. Thus, (1 − q n ) and (1 − q p ) are the updated probabilities that the dividend increases, given a negative or positive signal occurs. By definition, 1 ≥ q n ≥ (or q n = 1) the signal delivers no (perfect) information. For reasons of simplicity and tractability, we assume that the quality of the negative signal equals the quality of the positive signal, i.e. the updated probabilities satisfy q n = (1 − q p ).
In order to derive the bid and ask price for the model with public information, we follow the same equilibrium approach as above. In the initial model, there was one bid price and one ask price. This required two zero-profit conditions. In the extended model here, it is imperative to distinguish between the case of a positive signal and the case of a negative signal. Whenever the positive (negative) signal occurs, a high (low) price level is expected. Theses conditional price levels are labeled by the superscript + (−), indicating that a positive (negative) signal is received. This leads to different bid and ask prices conditional upon the either positive (P Proposition 4 Given q p = (1 −q n ), the equilibrium bid and ask prices conditional upon the positive or negative public signal, the 'a priori' prices, and the bid-ask spread are, pos. inf ormation :
neg. inf ormation : where
,
In proposition 4, the conditional bid and ask prices are given. In order to compare these results with our basic model, the average bid and ask price will be useful. Since the positive and negative signals occur with equal probability, the average prices, which are labeled by an asterisk, equal the mean of the conditional ask and bid price respectively, i.e. P signal. As suggested in proposition 4 these prices consist of six terms that allow for an interpretation very similar to the one of the basic model setting. The only substantial difference is that, as one would expect, there are two different price levels, depending on whether the positive or negative signal occurs. Now, the first three terms ( Similar to the basic model, the spread is made up of two terms. Again, one term can be attributed to the compensation liquidity supplying investors require for fixed transaction costs (c). The other term (D 3 ∆) can be attributed to the adverse selection cost compensation those investors require. In a comparative static analysis, it can be shown that the dependence of the spread on the model parameters remains the same as in the basic model (see table 2 ). The dependence of the spread on q n , the newly introduced signal quality, is, as intuition would suggest, negative. Note that whenever q n > 0.5 the condition D 3 < A 3 is satisfied.
We conclude that within the model additional public information always lowers the bid-ask spread. This is illustrated in figure 6 , where the adverse selection components of the basic model and the extended model are compared.
Depending on whether the negative or positive public signal occurs, the price level differs. This is what one would expect due to the effect of the public signal.
The first three terms of the conditional prices (i.e. is the fundamental value of the asset one would expect in a world without informational asymmetries and fixed transaction costs. D 1 c drags the price level down due to future fixed transaction costs. And the third term, D 2 ∆, represents the influence of adverse selection costs on the expected liquidation revenue. The new term, D 4 ∆, also influences the price level. This term affects positively (negatively) the price level conditional upon positive (negative) information. Since D 4 ∆ appears in the conditional prices with an opposing sign, the term is not reflected in the 'a priori' prices. The 'a priori' prices can be interpreted as the prices one would expect just prior to the occurrence of a public signal.
Intuitively, when the model is extended by public information, one would expect the adverse selection component of the price level (D 2 ∆) to be less negative (or greater) than the equivalent adverse selection term from the initial model. Interestingly however, this is not always the case. In figure 7 , the dependence of the adverse selection term in the price level (i.e. D 2 in the extended model and A 2 in the initial model) on the signal quality is depicted. For the graphical illustration, we arbitrarily set φ equal to 0.7 for the regime φ < 1 and equal to 1.3 for the regime φ > 1. Figure 7 , on the one hand, shows that, when φ < 1, the model implication is in line with intuition as D 2 > A 2 holds. On the other hand, for φ > 1, the reverse applies, and D 2 < A 2 . Hence, the model results suggest that in the regime with high public attention (i.e. φ > 1), the introduction of valuable public information may lead to a lower price level due to the adverse selection term D 2 .
Although public information always reduces the bid-ask-spread in the model, it is predicted that, under certain circumstances, better public information might lower the price level and consequently increase expected returns. This regime-dependent influence of the signal quality (q n ) on returns is what is particulary interesting in respect of the comparative statics of returns (see table 4).
It is worth noting that in the limiting case with perfect information (i.e. q n = 1), the two adverse selection terms the extended model the dependence of the price level, and the observable return i * differs to some extent form the basic model. Therefore, we depict in table 4 the comparative static signs of the gross return with respect to the relevant parameters values for the extended model setting. In analogy to the initial model, we define the return as i
, where P is now defined on the basis of the expected prices,
. Again, it is imperative to distinguish between the two regimes φ < 1 and φ > 1.
In the regime φ < 1, the signs of the comparative static analysis are all in line with intuition. When φ < 1, uninformed liquidity demand (α) either negatively or positively influences returns. This ambiguous influence arises because a higher α implies a higher trading frequency and thus more amortized fixed transaction costs (implying higher required gross returns) but lower adverse selection costs (implying lower required gross returns). In the same regime, higher informed liquidity demand (β) and higher fixed costs (c) ceteris paribus raise returns whereas higher public attention (φ) and higher quality of public information (q n ) entail lower returns. These comparative static signs are all in line with the predictions of Amihud & Mendelson (1986) , where higher bid-ask-spreads entail higher gross returns.
For the regime where φ > 1, which we interpret as a situation of high public interest in a specific stock, the extended model predicts again similar relations between the return and the parameters α, β and ∆ as in the original model. As information asymmetries increase (i.e. lower α and higher β), the returns may decrease. Furthermore, the model predicts that a higher risk of the dividend (i.e. a higher ∆) ceteris paribus also results in lower returns. Similarly, the quality of public information (i.e. q n ) is positively related to an asset's return whenever φ > 1. These signs again seem counterintuitive at the first sight. However, they are a consequence of the elevated probability to sell ask prices, when public attention is high. If φ > 1, investors know, that they are more likely to sell at the ask price via a limit order. This implies that investors themselves determine the price at which the asset is sold, and therefore the bid-ask spread is not a cost.
As a consequence, a higher bid-ask spread not necessarily translates into higher required gross returns.
C. Implications for empirical return regularities
Our model gives a new, but straightforward explanation of the magnitude and composition of observable excess returns. The results suggest that market microstructure effects, as stressed by O'Hara (2003) , could be indeed the missing link. We hypothesize that future trading costs of stocks, in combination with the anticipated level of public attention, drive empirically observed excess returns. To this end, we restate the derived return relationship of proposition 3:
Equation 10 demonstrates that excess returns in our model-setup are a function of future fixed transaction costs (B * 1 c) and adverse selection costs (B * 2 ∆), and the latter are crucially determined by the degree of public attention. In short, equilibrium excess returns compensate risk neutral investors exactly for anticipated future trading costs. When allowing for risk-aversion, at least an additional risk premium could be added.
Empirical asset pricing tests often investigate the relevance of specific stock characteristics for explaining asset returns. Most attention thereby attracted the following specification of Fama & French (1992) , who proposed three stock characteristics, i.e. a stock's beta, market capitalization (ME) and book-to-market ratio(BE/ME).
At the first sight, the specification in equation 11 does not seem to be related to our hypothesis that trading costs and public attention are important drivers of stock returns. However, we argue, that size and the book-to-market ratio are proxies for adverse selection and public attention. Therefore, it is possible that the explanatory power of these stock characteristics is a result of their relatedness to the market microstructure issues discussed in our theoretical model above.
It is well-known, that small size stocks and those with a high book-to-market ratio exhibit higher returns (this is empirically documented among others by Banz (1981) or Fama & French (1992) ). We argue that it is possible to draw plausible conclusions about the relation between these two stock characteristics and the degree of adverse selection or public attention, and thereby explain these empirical regularities. To proceed our argument let us distinguish four stock types: small stocks, large stocks, value stocks, and growth stocks. Our goal is to describe these stock types using measures implied in our model. These measures are (1) the degree of public attention, and (2) the degree of adverse selection (i.e. the driver of transaction costs). In table 5 we make suggestions how the four stock types may be best described by public attention and adverse selection on average and deduce the model's predictions about required returns and bid-ask-spreads. We argue that small stocks have on average a low level of public attention but exhibit high future returns and high bid-ask spreads. Large stocks should have a higher level of public attention compared to small stocks, because of a larger investor base, higher media and analyst coverage, etc. But this does not imply that public attention is always high for such firms. Consequently, we suppose that the average level of public attention for large firms is rather moderate, implying rather low future returns. On the other hand, if large firms are more transparent compared to small stocks, the adverse selection for those stocks is rather low, leading to low bid-ask spreads. Growth stocks typically experienced large stock price increases in the recent past. If such increases attracts more public attention, past returns are high (due to stock price increases) but the model predicts that future returns are low. On the contrary, value stocks exhibited low past returns (due to stock price decreases), implying low public attention and high future returns. Since we are not aware of any straightforward assertion in respect of the adverse selection of growth or value stocks, we refrain from assigning any public attention specifications to these stocks. All in all, we come up with the stock classifications and respective model implications given in table 5.
In table 6 we combine stocks by their size and book-to-market ratio and depict the model's implications, which are deduced from table 5. It should be noted that these predictions are broadly consistent with empirical results.
The model's predictions are consistent with important recent empirical studies concerning the cross-section of stock returns. Fang & Peress (2009) report that no media coverage (i.e. low public attention) implies higher returns than stocks with high media coverage (i.e. high public attention) even after controlling for well-known risk factors. Similarly, high idiosyncratic volatility may serve as a Cooper et al. (2008) find that asset growth and subsequent returns are strongly negatively related. Given that asset growth proxies public attention then, again, their findings are consistent with the model's implications. If public attention is positively related to past returns, our model also implies term return continuation. This seems very plausible, because investors tend to buy stocks that catch their attention (see e.g. Barber & Odean (2008) ). Stocks which exhibit high past returns are very visible in the market because of media reports which attracts public attention. Lehavy & Sloan (2008) document that investors' recognition (i.e. a possible measure for public attention) for specific stocks tends to increase when past returns are high and decrease when past returns are low. Similarly, Griffin et al. (2007) show in an empirical analysis of 46 countries, that there is a strong positive relation between past returns and turnover (i.e. another possible proxy for public attention). We interpret these results as supportive for our hypothesis that public attention is positively related to past returns. If this is the case, high past returns imply an increasing public attention, which in turn gives an additional boost to prices, thus causing return continuation. Besides providing a plausible explanation for the above mentioned stock characteristics, our model may also shed new light on characteristics that relate to the market microstructure of stocks. Specifically, what we have in mind is the relation between turnover or order imbalance and returns. Datar et al. (1998) for example find a negative relation between turnover and stock returns. They attributed this finding to liquidity, by supposing that higher turnover implies better liquidity. In the light of our model, turnover may also be a proxy for public attention and thus causing the negative influence on expected returns. 11 Moreover, Chordia et al. (2002) , Chordia & Subrahmanyam (2004) or Kaul & Kayacetin (2008) document that lagged order imbalance appears to be negatively related to returns. Since high order imbalance implies a large fraction of trades at ask prices, it translates directly into high public attention in terms of our model. We argue, that high order imbalance means that investors anticipate to sell rather at ask-prices and therefore expect to incur lower transaction costs. This leads to a higher price level implying lower expected returns.
Finally, we want to discuss distressed and neglected stocks. Campbell et al. (2008) documented that distressed firms are very risky but nevertheless exhibit implausible low returns. For distressed stocks we propose two offsetting effects.
Distressed stock are typically similar to small value stocks, implying high average returns. But contrary to "normal" small value stocks, distressed stocks may have also a high level of public attention, because of intense media following. Since high public attention implies lower returns, small value stocks should have higher returns than distressed firms. Furthermore, in our model public attention alone does not influence the bid-ask-spread, so we would nonetheless expect very high spreads for distressed stocks. Neglected stocks are also very similar to small value stocks. But by definition, public attention of these stocks is very low, implying a high average return, without influencing bid-ask-spreads.
Summing up, our model is able to address many empirical regularities in a consistent manner. We argue that the size effect, book-to-market effect, and return continuation (momentum effect) are rooted in the rational response of investors to current and future trading cost, driven by the degree of adverse selection and public attention. Moreover the model addresses return regularities of distressed and neglected stocks as well as the relation between returns and turnover or order imbalances. Furthermore, we want to stress that no behavioral assumptions are needed in the first place to produce this results. Pricing relies completely on rational investors providing liquidity to the market. But of course, when additional irrational investors (or noise traders in the sense of Bagehot (1971) or Black (1986) ) enter or exit the market in a predictable way seeking liquidity (e.g. to buy 'glamor' stocks or momentum stocks, but ignoring 'boring' value stocks), the current and future trading conditions for rational liquidity supplying traders will improve, reinforcing our model results.
D. Conclusion
We investigate the relation between asset returns and the determinants of bid-askspreads and argue that variations in public attention crucially determine crosssectional return differences. In a discounted cash flow model, we integrate adverse selection and fixed trading costs that lead to an endogenous bid-ask-spread. This allows us to model different determinants of the bid-ask-spread in a fashion that is in line with standard market-microstructure theory. In addition to that, the model allows to assess how these determinants relate to the required gross returns. We draw the conclusion that there are two regimes conditional upon the degree of public attention.
As a result, we derive implications that are open to empirical verification. The first implication of the model is that public attention determines two regimes, in which the impact of some sources of the bid-ask-spread on asset returns reverse. On the one hand, in the case of low public attention to a stock, the influence of adverse selection and dividend risk on the return is positive, because agents require higher gross returns as compensation. On the other hand, when there is exceptional high public attention to a stock, the model predicts that a higher dividend risk and more adverse selection may entail lower returns. This is in contrast to the strictly positive relation between bid-ask-spreads and returns as in Amihud & Mendelson (1986) .
Second, we show that public information reduces the bid-ask-spread as adverse selection costs are reduced. However, the aforementioned regime-dependent impact of adverse selection and dividend risk remains robust. Similarly to that, the relation between information quality and returns also depends on the level of public attention. In case of low (high) public attention, a better quality of the public signal implies lower (higher) required returns.
We further argue that the explanatory power of adverse selection costs and public attention for cross sectional returns is consistent with many empirical re-turn regularities. In particular, we hypothesize that the size, book-to-market and momentum effect could -at least to some extend -be explained by our model's implications.
Due to its simplicity, the model has some limitations. We presume that the dividend follows an arithmetic random walk where the dividend change equals ∆. From a theoretical point of view, this assumption seems unsatisfactory as dividends and thus prices might attain negative values. To overcome this issue, it would be valuable to presume a geometric random walk or a mean-reverting process. Interesting implications might also result from limited liability, i.e. introducing a threshold where the dividend process is stopped. We also presume risk-neutrality and therefore do not encompass possible issues that arise by reason of risk aversion. Other limitations result from the exclusion of quantity decisions, and from the assumption that agents can only trade one asset. Thus, the consideration of quantity and asset selection decisions promises further insights.
Thus the total expected liquidation revenue (the sum of the two geometric series) can be stated as:
(1 − µ 1 )γ (1 − µ 1 )γ + µ 2 + P b µ 2 (1 − µ 1 )γ + µ 2 = wP a + (1 − w)P b where w is given as 
